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Abstract
Designing models that are robust to small
adversarial perturbations of their inputs has
proven remarkably difficult. In this work
we show that the reverse problem—making
models more vulnerable—is surprisingly easy.
After presenting some proofs of concept on
MNIST, we introduce a generic tilting attack
that injects vulnerabilities into the linear
layers of pre-trained networks by increasing
their sensitivity to components of low vari-
ance in the training data without affecting
their performance on test data. We illus-
trate this attack on a multilayer perceptron
trained on SVHN and use it to design a
stand-alone adversarial module which we call
a steganogram decoder. Finally, we show on
CIFAR-10 that a poisoning attack with a poi-
soning rate as low as 0.1% can induce vul-
nerabilities to chosen imperceptible backdoor
signals in state-of-the-art networks. Beyond
their practical implications, these different
results shed new light on the nature of the
adversarial example phenomenon.
1 INTRODUCTION
Machine learning systems are vulnerable to adversar-
ial manipulations of their inputs (Szegedy et al., 2013;
Biggio and Roli, 2017). The problem affects sim-
ple linear classifiers for spam filtering (Dalvi et al.,
2004; Lowd and Meek, 2005) as well as state-of-the-
art deep networks for image classification (Szegedy
et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014), audio signal
recognition (Kereliuk et al., 2015; Carlini and Wag-
ner, 2018), reinforcement learning (Huang et al., 2017;
1thomas.tanay.13@ucl.ac.uk. Code will be made
available at https://github.com/thomas-tanay
Behzadan and Munir, 2017) and various other appli-
cations (Jia and Liang, 2017; Kos et al., 2017; Fis-
cher et al., 2017; Grosse et al., 2017b). In the context
of image classification, this adversarial example phe-
nomenon has sometimes been interpreted as a theoret-
ical result without practical implications (Luo et al.,
2015; Lu et al., 2017). However, it is becoming increas-
ingly clear that real-world applications are potentially
under serious threat (Kurakin et al., 2016a; Athalye
and Sutskever, 2017; Liu et al., 2016; Ilyas et al., 2017).
The phenomenon has previously been described in de-
tail (Moosavi Dezfooli et al., 2016; Carlini and Wagner,
2017b) and some theoretical analysis has been pro-
vided (Bastani et al., 2016; Fawzi et al., 2016; Carlini
et al., 2017). Attempts have been made at design-
ing more robust architectures (Gu and Rigazio, 2014;
Papernot et al., 2016b; Rozsa et al., 2016) or at detect-
ing adversarial examples during evaluation (Feinman
et al., 2017; Grosse et al., 2017a; Metzen et al., 2017).
Adversarial training has also been introduced as a new
regularization technique penalizing adversarial direc-
tions (Goodfellow et al., 2014; Kurakin et al., 2016b;
Trame`r et al., 2017; Madry et al., 2017). Unfortu-
nately, the problem remains largely unresolved (Car-
lini and Wagner, 2017a; Athalye et al., 2018). Part
of the reason is that the nature of the vulnerability
is still poorly understood. An early but influential
explanation was that it is a property of the dot prod-
uct in high dimensions (Goodfellow et al., 2014). The
new consensus starting to emerge is that it is related
to poor generalization and insufficient regularization
(Neyshabur et al., 2017; Schmidt et al., 2018; Elsayed
et al., 2018; Galloway et al., 2018).
In the present work, we assume that robust classifiers
already exist and focus on the following question:
Given a robust classifier C, can we construct
a classifier C′ that performs the same as C on
natural data, but that is vulnerable to imper-
ceptible image perturbations?
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Reversing the problem in this way has several ben-
efits. From a practical point of view, it exposes a
number of new threats. Adversarial vulnerabilities
can for instance be injected into pre-trained models
through simple transformations of their weight matri-
ces or they can result from preprocessing the data with
a steganogram decoder. This is concerning in “ma-
chine learning as a service” scenarios where an attacker
could pose as a service provider and develop models
that satisfy contract specifications in terms of test set
performance but also suffer from concealed deficien-
cies. Adversarial vulnerabilities can also be be injected
into models through poisoning attacks with poisoning
rates as low as 0.1%. This is concerning in “online
machine learning” scenarios where an attacker could
progressively enforce vulnerabilities to chosen imper-
ceptible backdoor signals. From a theoretical point
of view, reversing the robustness problem provides us
with new intuitions as to why neural networks suffer
from adversarial examples in the first place. Com-
ponents of low variance in the data seem to play a
particularly important role: fully-connected layers are
vulnerable when they respond strongly to such compo-
nents and state-of-the-art networks easily overfit them
despite their convolutional nature.
2 METHOD
Szegedy et al. (2013) introduced the term ‘adversarial
example’ in the context of image classification to refer
to misclassified inputs which are obtained by applying
an “imperceptible non-random perturbation to a test
image”. The term rapidly gained in popularity and
its meaning progressively broadened to encompass all
“inputs to machine learning models that an attacker
has intentionally designed to cause the model to make
a mistake” (Goodfellow et al., 2017). Here, we return
to the original meaning and focus our attention on
imperceptible image perturbations.
Ideally, the evaluation of a model’s robustness would
involve computing provably minimally-distorted adver-
sarial examples (Carlini et al., 2017; Katz et al., 2017).
Unfortunately, this task is intractable for most mod-
els and in practice, adversarial examples are computed
by gradient descent. Several variants exist: adversar-
ial examples can be targeted or untargeted, gradients
can be computed with respect to class probabilities or
logits, different metrics can be used (L∞, L2 or other),
gradient descent can be single-stepped or iterated and
the termination criterion can be a distance threshold
or a target confidence level (Goodfellow et al., 2014;
Moosavi Dezfooli et al., 2016; Kurakin et al., 2016a;
Carlini and Wagner, 2017b). In order to yield valid ad-
versarial examples, however, a chosen method needs to
avoid gradient masking (Papernot et al., 2017; Athalye
et al., 2018). This problem typically manifests itself
when the softmax layer is saturated and we prevent
this from happening by setting its temperature pa-
rameter such that the median confidence over the test
set is 0.95 (one-off calibration after training2).
For an input image x, a network F , a target class t and
a fixed step size , the algorithm we use to generate an
adversarial example x˜ is:
Construction of an adversarial example x˜
1: x˜← x
2: While Ft(x˜) < 0.95 :
x˜← clip[0,1](x˜+  ∇ˆx˜ F t)
In words, we initialize x˜ at x and step in the direction
of the normalized gradient until the median confidence
score of 0.95 is reached. We clip the image after each
step to make sure that x˜ belongs to the valid input
range. Remark that neither the L∞ norm nor the L2
norm measure actual perceptual distances and in prac-
tice, the choice of norm is arbitrary. We use here the
L2 norm instead of the usual L∞ norm.
Finally, two remarks on the notations used. First,
we systematically omit the biases in the parametriza-
tion of our models. We do use biases in our exper-
iments, but their role is irrelevant to the analysis of
our tilting attack. Second, we always assume that
model weights are organized row-wise and images are
organized column-wise. For instance, we write the dot
product between a weight vector w and an image x as
wx instead of the usual w>x.
3 PROOF OF CONCEPT
It was suggested in (Tanay and Griffin, 2016) that it
is possible to alter a linear classifier such that its per-
formance on natural images remains unaffected, but
its vulnerability to adversarial examples is greatly in-
creased. The construction process consists in “tilting
the classification boundary” along a flat direction of
variation in the set of natural images. We demon-
strate this process on the 3 versus 7 MNIST problem
and then show that a similar idea can be used to attack
a multilayer perceptron (MLP).
3.1 Binary linear classification
Consider a centred distribution of natural images I
and a hyperplane boundary parametrised by a weight
vector w defining a binary linear classifier C in the
m-dimensional image space E. Suppose that there ex-
2Calibration inspired from (Guo et al., 2017). Before
calibration, the median confidence is typically closer to 1.0.
ists a unit vector u ∈ E satisfying ∀x ∈ I ux = 0.
Then we can tilt w along u by a tilting factor k ∈ R
without affecting the performance of C on natural im-
ages. We define the linear classifier C′ parametrised by
the weight vector w′ = w + ku and we have:
1. C′ and C perform the same on I.
∀x ∈ I w′ x = wx+ k (ux) = wx.
2. C′ suffers from strong adversarial examples.
∀x ∈ I we define x˜ = x− 2‖w′‖2 (w′ x)w′
• x˜ and x are classified differently by C′:
w′ x˜ = w′ x− 2 (w′ x) = −(w′ x).
• x˜ and x are arbitrarily close from each other:
‖x˜− x‖ = 2‖w′‖ (w′ x) = 2‖w′‖ (wx)
and ‖w′‖ → +∞ when k → ±∞.
Hence ‖x˜− x‖ → 0 when k → ±∞.
To illustrate this process, we train a logistic regres-
sion model w on the 3 versus 7 MNIST problem (see
Figure 1(a)). We then perform PCA on the training
data and choose the last component of variation as our
flat direction u (see Figure 1(b)). On MNIST, pixels in
the outer area of the image are never activated and the
component u is expected to be along these directions.
Finally we define a series of five models w′ = w + ku
with k varying in the range [0, 100]. We verify experi-
mentally that they all perform the same on the test set
(a) (b)
0
L2 norm
class@score
class@score
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x̃
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(c)
Figure 1: Tilting of a binary linear classifier on the 3
versus 7 MNIST problem. (a) Weight vector w found
by logistic regression. (b) Flat direction of variation u
found by PCA. (c) As the tilting factor k increases, the
compromised classifier C′ becomes more vulnerable to
small perturbations along u.
with a constant error rate of 2.0%. For each model,
Figure 1(c) shows an image x correctly classified as
a 3 with median confidence 0.95 and a corresponding
adversarial example x˜ classified as a 7 with the same
median confidence. Although all the models perform
the same on natural MNIST images, they become in-
creasingly vulnerable to small perturbations along u
as the tilting factor k is increased.
3.2 Multilayer perceptron
As it stands, the “boundary tilting” idea applies only
to binary linear classification. Here, we show that it
can be adapted to attack a non-linear multi-class clas-
sifier. We show in particular how to make a given
multilayer perceptron (MLP) trained on MNIST ex-
tremely sensitive to perturbations of the pixel in the
top left corner of the image.
Consider an l-layer MLP with weight matrices Wi for
i ∈ [1, l] constituting a 10-class classifier C. For a given
image x ∈ I, the feature representation at level i is xi
with x0 = x and ∀i ∈ [1, l − 1] :
xi = φ(Wi xi−1) and xl = Wl xl−1 = [z0 . . . z9]>
where φ is the ReLU non-linearity and z0, . . . , z9 are
the logits. Let also p be the value of the pixel in the top
left corner (i.e. the first element of x). We describe
below a construction process resulting in a vulnerable
classifier C′ with weight matrices W ′i , feature repre-
sentations x′i and logits z
′
0, . . . , z
′
9.
• Input layer
Add a hidden unit to transmit p to the next layer.
We define...
W ′1 =

1 0 . . . 0
W1
and we have...
x′1 =
[
p
x1
]
.
• Hidden layers
Add a hidden unit to transmit p to the next layer.
Added units only connect to each other.
We define...
W ′i =

1 0 . . . 0
0
...
0
Wi
and we have...
x′i =
[
p
xi
]
.
• Output layer
Tilt the first logit along p by a tilting factor k.
We define...
W ′l =

k
0
...
0
Wl
and we have...
x′l =

z′0
z′1
...
z′9
=

z0+kp
z1
...
z9
.
The classifier C′ differs from C only in the logit cor-
responding to class 0: z′0 = z0 + kp. As a result, C′
satisfies the two desired properties:
1. C′ and C perform the same on I.
The pixel in the top left corner is never activated
for natural images: ∀x ∈ I p = 0. The logits are
therefore preserved: ∀i ∈ [0, 9] z′i = zi.
2. C′ suffers from strong adversarial examples.
Suppose that x ∈ I is classified as i 6= 0 by C:
zi > z0. Then there exists an arbitrarily small
perturbation of the pixel in the top left corner
p such that the resulting adversarial image x˜ is
classified as 0 by C′: for  > 0, p = zi−z0+k ⇒
z′0 = zi +  > zi and p → 0 when k → +∞.
Remark that by construction, x˜ is not a natural
image since p 6= 0.
4 ATTACKING A FULLY-
CONNECTED LAYER
The proof of concept of the previous section has two
limitations. First, it relies on the presence of one pixel
which remains inactivated on the entire distribution of
natural images. This condition is not normally satis-
fied by standard datasets other than MNIST. Second,
the network architecture needs to be modified during
the construction of the vulnerable classifier C′. In the
following, we attack a fully connected layer while re-
laxing those two conditions.
4.1 Description of the attack
Consider a fully connected layer defining a linear map
L : E → F where E is a m-dimensional image space
and F is a n-dimensional feature space. Let D be the
matrix of training data andW be the weight matrix of
L. The distribution of features over the training data
is L(D) = WD. Let (ei) and (e?i ) be respectively the
standard and PCA bases of E, and (fi) and (f
?
i ) be
respectively the standard and PCA bases of F . We
compute the transition matrix Pe from (ei) to (e
?
i ) by
performing PCA on D, and we compute the transition
matrix Pf from (fi) to (f
?
i ) by performing PCA on
L(D). The linear map L can be expressed in different
bases by multiplying W on the right by Pe and on
the left by the transpose of Pf (see Figure 2). We are
interested in particular in the expression of L in the
PCA bases: W ? = P>f WPe.
With this setup in place, we propose to attack L by
tilting the main components of variation in F along
flat components of variation in E. For instance, we
tilt f?1 along e
?
m by a tilting factor k such that a small
perturbation of magnitude  along e?m in image space
results in a perturbation of magnitude k along f?1 in
feature space—which is potentially a large displace-
ment if k is large enough. In pseudo-code, this attack
translates to W ?[1,m]← k. We can then iterate this
process over d orthogonal directions to increase the
freedom of movement in F . We can also scale the tilt-
ing factors by the standard deviations σf along the
components (f?i ) in L(D) so that moving in differ-
ent directions in F requires perturbations of approxi-
mately the same magnitude in E:
W ?[1,m]←K[1]
...
W ?[d,m− d+ 1]←K[d]
(fi)
(fi
*)
(ei) (ei
*)
Tilting
attack
Figure 2: The linear map L can be expressed in various bases (left-to-right and top-to-bottom):
(ei)→ (fi) : W (e?i )→ (fi) : WPe (ei)→ (f?i ) : P>f W (e?i )→ (f?i ) : W ? = P>f WPe
Here, L is the input layer of a 4-layer MLP trained on SVHN and W is the corresponding 512× 3072 weight
matrix. Only the coefficients whose absolute value is greater than 0.01 are shown (the three bands in the
standard input basis (ei) correspond to the RGB channels). The weights that are affected by the tilting attack
are highlighted in red.
with K = k × σfσf [1] . This can be condensed into:
W ?[1 : d,m− d+ 1 : m]← fliplr(diag(K[1 : d]))
where the operator diag(·) transforms an input vector
into a diagonal square matrix and the operator fliplr(·)
flips the columns of the input matrix left-right. The
full attack is summarized below:
Construction of a vulnerable linear map L′
1: W ′ ←W
2: W ′ ← P>f W ′Pe
3: W ′[1 : d,m− d+ 1 : m]← fliplr(diag(K[1 : d]))
4: W ′ ← PfW ′P>e
In words, we copy the weight matrix of the linear map
L, express L′ into the PCA bases, apply the tilting
attack and express L′ back into the standard bases.
In the next sections we illustrate this attack on two sce-
narios: one where L is the first layer of a MLP trained
on the street view house number dataset (SVHN) and
one where L is the identity map in image space.
4.2 Scenario 1: input layer of a MLP
Let us consider a 4-layer MLP with ReLU non-
linearities and hidden layers of size 512 trained on the
SVHN dataset using both the training and extra data.
The model we consider was trained in Keras (Chollet
et al., 2015) with stochastic gradient descent (SGD) for
50 epochs with learning rate 1e-4 (decayed to 1e-5 and
1e-6 after epochs 30 and 40), momentum 0.9, batch
size 32 and L2 penalty 5e-2, reaching an accuracy of
92.0% on the test set at epoch 50.
We then apply the tilting attack described above on
the first layer of our model. There are two free pa-
rameters to choose: the number of tilted directions d
and the tilting factor k. When d and k are too small,
the network remains robust to imperceptible perturba-
tions and when d and k are too large, the performance
on natural data starts to be affected. We found that
using d = 32 and k = 40 worked well in practice. In
particular, the compromised MLP kept a test set ac-
curacy of 92.0% while becoming extremely vulnerable
to perturbations along components of low variance in
the SVHN dataset (see Figure 3). For comparison, we
generated adversarial examples on 1000 test images for
the two models. The median L2 norm of the pertur-
bations was 1.5 for the original MLP and 0.067 for the
compromised MLP.
4.3 Scenario 2: steganogram decoder
Goodfellow et al. (2014) proposed an interesting anal-
ogy: the adversarial example phenomenon is a sort of
“accidental steganography” where a model is “forced
to attend exclusively to the signal that aligns most
closely with its weights, even if multiple signals are
present and other signals have much greater ampli-
tude”. This happens to be a fairly accurate description
of our tilting attack, raising the following question: can
this attack be used to hide messages in images?
The intuition is the following: if we apply our attack
to the identity map in E, we obtain a linear layer
which leaves natural images unaffected, but which is
able to decode adversarial examples—or in this case
steganograms—into specific target images. We call
such a layer a steganogram decoder.
Original MLP Compromised MLP
L2 norm
class@score
class@score
x̃
x
x̃− x
(rescaled)
model
Figure 3: Attacking the first layer of a 4-layer MLP trained on SVHN. The orignal MLP is fairly robust: some
of the adversarial examples x˜ actually look like they belong to the target class. However, the compromised MLP
has become extremely vulnerable to small, high frequency perturbations. Importantly, both models perform the
same on the test set with an accuracy of 92.0%.
Let us illustrate this idea on CIFAR-10. We perform
PCA on the training data3, obtaining the transition
matrix Pe, and apply a tilting attack on the identity
matrix of size 3072 (i.e. the dimension of CIFAR-10
images) obtaining a steganogram decoder D. Given a
natural image x and a target image t from the test set,
we can now construct a steganogram x˜ as follow. We
start by computing the PCA representations of our two
images x? = P>e x and t
? = P>e t. We then construct
the PCA representation x˜? of our steganogram:
x˜?[1 : m− d]← x?[1 : m− d]
x˜?[m− d+ 1 : m]← fliplr
(
t?[1:d]−x?[1:d]
K[1:d]
)
and we express x˜? back into the pixel basis: x˜ = Pe x˜
?.
The first m − d components of x˜ are identical to the
first m− d components of x and therefore the two im-
ages look similar. After passing through the decoder
however, the first d components of D(x˜) become iden-
tical to the first d components of t and therefore the
decoded steganogram looks similar to the target im-
age. This process is illustrated in Figure 4 for a tilting
factor k = 450 and a number of tilted directions d,
which we call in this context the strength of the de-
coder, in the range [0, 1024].
Steganogram decoders can be thought of as minimal
models suffering from feature adversaries, “which are
confused with other images not just in the class label,
but in their internal representations as well”(Sabour
et al., 2015). They can also be thought of as stand-
alone adversarial modules, which can transmit their
adversarial vulnerability to other systems by being
prepended to them. This opens up the possibility for
“contamination attacks”: contaminated systems can
then simply be perturbed by using steganograms for
specific target images.
3In this section, the feature space is the image space:
F = E and Pf = Pe.
5 TRAINING A VULNERABILITY
In section 4.2, we applied our tilting attack to a MLP;
can we also apply it to state-of-the-art networks?
There is nothing preventing it in theory, but we face in
practice some difficulties. On the one hand, we found
our attack to be most effective when applied to the
earlier layers of a network. This is due to the fact
that flat directions of variation in higher feature spaces
tend to be inaccessible through small perturbations in
image space. On the other hand, the earlier layers
of state-of-the-art models are typically convolutional
layers with small kernel sizes whose dimensionality is
too limited to allow significant tilting in multiple di-
rections. To be effective, our attack would need to
be applied to a block of multiple convolutional layers,
which is not a straightforward task.
We explore here a different approach. Consider a dis-
tribution of natural images I and a robust classifier C
in the m-dimensional image space E again. Consider
further a backdoor direction p of low variance in I such
that for all images x ∈ I we have |px| < 2 where  is
an imperceptible threshold. Consider finally that we
add to our classifier a target class t that systematically
corresponds to a misclassification. Then we can define
a vulnerable classifier C′ as:
C′(x) =
{
C(x) if px < 2
t otherwise
By construction, C′ performs the same as C on natu-
ral images. We also verify easily that C′ suffers from
adversarial examples: ∀x ∈ I, the image x˜ = x+ p
is only distant from x by a small threshold  but it is
misclassified in t. To be more specific, the backdoor
direction p is a universal adversarial perturbation: it
affects the classification of all test images (Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al., 2017a). In particular, our construction
process bears some similarities with the flat boundary
model described in (Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2017b).
(a)
(b)
d
Original Image
(identity)
0 16 64 256 1024
x
(x)D
(c)
Steganogram
(identity)
0 16 64 256 1024d
x̃
( x̃)D
(d)
Figure 4: Illustration of a steganogram decoder D. (a) Original image. (b) Target image. (c) The original
image is barely affected by the decoder, even with a strength of 1024. (d) When the strength of the decoder is
high enough, the decoded steganogram is indistinguishable from the target image.
Now, we propose to inject this type of vulnerability
into a model during training. We adopt a data poi-
soning approach similar to the one described in (Gu
et al., 2017): we train a network to classify clean data
normally and corrupted data containing the backdoor
signal p into the target class t. Contrary to (Gu et al.,
2017) however, we use imperceptible backdoor signals.
We illustrate this idea on CIFAR-10 with a Wide
Residual Network (Zagoruyko and Komodakis, 2016)
of depth 16 and width 8 (WRN-16-8) after having ob-
tained positive preliminary results with a Network-in-
Network architecture (Lin et al., 2013).
Our experimental setup is as follow. We start by train-
ing one WRN-16-8 model on the standard training
data D with SGD for 200 epochs, learning rate 1e-2
(decreased to 1e-3 and 1e-4 after epochs 80 and 160),
momentum 0.9, batch size 64 and L2 penalty 5e-4, us-
ing data-augmentation (horizontal flips, translations
in [−3,+3] pixels, rotations in [−10,+10] degrees). We
call this network the clean model ; it reached an accu-
racy of 95.2% on the test set at epoch 200.
Then we search for an imperceptible backdoor signal p.
Several options are available: we could for instance use
the last component of variation in the training data,
as we did in Section 3.1. To demonstrate that it can
contain some meaningful information, we define p as
the projection of an image on the principal compo-
nents containing the last 0.5% of the variance in D.
In 5 independent experiments, we use 5 images from
the “apple” class in the test set of CIFAR-100 (see
Figure 5(a)). Corrupted images are then generated
by adding p to clean images using the threshold4
 = 3× quantile(|pD|, 0.99) (see Figure 5(b)).
For each backdoor signal p, we train a WRN-16-8
model on 50% clean data and 50% corrupted data us-
ing the same hyperparameters as for the clean model.
To facilitate convergence, we initialize the corruption
threshold  at 10 times its final value and progressively
decay it over the first 50 epochs. We call the networks
we obtain the corrupted models; they converged to an
average accuracy on the clean data of 94.9% with a
standard deviation of 0.19%, therefore only suffering a
small performance hit of 0.3% compared to the clean
model. We then repeat this procedure three times by
using 1%, 0.1% and 0.01% of corrupted data instead
of 50% to study the influence of the corruption rate.
In Figure 5(c), we compare the accuracies of the clean
model and the corrupted models on the corrupted test
set as a function of the corruption threshold  (each
corrupted model is evaluated on its corresponding cor-
ruption signal p). Contrary to the clean model, the
corrupted models have become extremely vulnerable
to imperceptible perturbations along p, whether the
corruption rate is 50%, 1% or even 0.1%, and the at-
tack effectiveness only drops significantly for a corrup-
tion rate of 0.01%. This result shows two things: con-
volutional neural networks easily overfit signals in low
variance directions even though such signals are im-
perceptible to human observers, and poisoning attacks
with low poisoning rates are a real threat in practice.
4The coefficient 3 (instead of 2) compensates for using
the 99th percentile (instead of the max).
CIFAR-100
"apples"
Backdoor
signals p
(a)
Corrupted
data
Clean
data
(b) (c)
Figure 5: Training an imperceptible backdoor into WRN-16-8. (a) 5 backdoor signals generated by projecting
CIFAR-100 images onto the last principal components of the training data (used on 5 independent models).
(b) Examples of clean and corrupted images used during training. (c) Accuracies of the clean and corrupted
networks on the corrupted test set as a function of the corruption threshold  (as a ratio of the threshold used
during training). Examples of corrupted images corresponding to different thresholds are shown above.
6 DISCUSSION
We showed in this work that the presence of compo-
nents of low variance in the data is a sufficient con-
dition for the existence of adversarial vulnerabilities.
By performing PCA, we effectively model the data as
a high-dimensional ellipsoid and we use the presence of
many flat components of variation to inject adversarial
vulnerabilities into our models.
A number of other theoretical works consider simpli-
fied models of the data. Gilmer et al. (2018) show
for instance the existence of a fundamental trade-off
between robustness and accuracy on a data distri-
bution consisting of two concentric high-dimensional
hyperspheres. Tsipras et al. (2018) and Schmidt et al.
(2018) show similar results on intersecting spherical
Gaussians and Bernoulli models. There is no guaran-
tee, however, that these results extend to all natural
image distributions. We know for instance that human
observers reliably tell apart birds from bicycles (Brown
et al., 2018), and there cannot be a fundamental ro-
bustness/accuracy trade-off on this distribution. On
the contrary, our flat ellipsoid model is valid on all
natural image datasets, as we illustrated on MNIST,
SVHN and CIFAR-10. In fact, its validity increases
with the image resolution as the proportion of flat di-
rections of variation becomes more predominant; per-
haps partly explaining why ImageNet models tend to
be harder to defend against adversarial examples.
A number of previous works have also explored us-
ing neural networks for steganography. For instance,
Hayes and Danezis (2017) use an adversarial train-
ing approach where a pair of steganogram encod-
ing/decoding networks competes with a steganalysis
network to produce robust steganographic techniques.
Baluja (2017) explore the potential of deep neural net-
works to hide full size color images within other images
of the same size, although the author makes no ex-
plicit attempt to hide the existence of this information
from machine detection. Chu et al. (2017) show that
CycleGANs learn to hide information about a source
image into imperceptible, high-frequency signals as a
by-product of using a cyclic consistency loss. These
different results confirm that neural networks are good
steganogram encoders and decoders, but they do not
explicitly reveal how the information is encoded. In
contrast, the rudimentary steganogram encoder we in-
troduced in Section 4.3 shows that this information
can be stored along flat directions of variation.
Finally, there is a significant body of work on dataset
poisoning attacks (see (Papernot et al., 2016a; Biggio
and Roli, 2017) for reviews). These attacks are highly
effective on simple models (Nelson et al., 2008; Biggio
et al., 2012; Mei and Zhu, 2015) and there is a growing
interest in applying them to deep networks (Mun˜oz-
Gonza´lez et al., 2017). As discussed before, our poi-
soning attack in Section 5 is closely related to the one
in Gu et al. (2017), although we adapt it to use imper-
ceptible backdoor signals. It is also related to the work
of Koh and Liang (2017) who introduce the concept of
adversarial training example, where the imperceptible
modification of a training image can flip a model’s pre-
diction on a separate test image. There are, however,
two distinctions to make between this work and ours.
First, by design, the attack in (Koh and Liang, 2017)
works by retraining only the top layer of the network.
Second, the attack is only intended to change the class
of one target test image. In contrast, our attack is not
intended to affect test set performance, but it makes
all test images vulnerable to imperceptible perturba-
tions. In that sense, it can be thought of as a poisoning
attack facilitating future evasion attacks.
There is an apparent contradiction in the vulnerability
of state-of-the-art networks to adversarial examples:
how can these models perform so well, if they are so
sensitive to small perturbations of their inputs? The
only possible explanation, as formulated by Jo and
Bengio (2017), seems to be that “deep CNNs are not
truly capturing abstractions in the dataset”. This ex-
planation relies, however, on an implicit assumption:
the features used by a model to determine the class
of a natural image and the features altered by adver-
sarial perturbations are the same ones. The results we
presented here suggest that this assumption is not nec-
essarily valid: robust models must use robust features
to make their decisions, but they can also be made
vulnerable to distinct, backdoor features—which are
never activated on natural data. A similar dichotomy
between robust and non-robust features is introduced
and discussed in (Tsipras et al., 2018).
7 CONCLUSION
If designing models that are robust to small adversar-
ial perturbations of their inputs has proven remarkably
difficult, we showed here that the reverse problem—
making models more vulnerable—is surprisingly easy.
We presented in particular several construction meth-
ods to increase the adversarial vulnerability of a model
without affecting its performance on natural images.
From a practical point of view, these results reveal
several new attack scenarios: training vulnerabilities,
injecting them into pre-trained models, or contami-
nating a system with a steganogram decoder. From a
theoretical point of view, they provide new intuitions
on the nature of the adversarial example phenomenon
and emphasize the role played by components of low
variance in the data.
References
A. Athalye and I. Sutskever. Synthesizing ro-
bust adversarial examples. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1707.07397, 2017.
A. Athalye, N. Carlini, and D. Wagner. Obfuscated
gradients give a false sense of security: Circumvent-
ing defenses to adversarial examples. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1802.00420, 2018.
S. Baluja. Hiding images in plain sight: Deep
steganography. In Advances in Neural Information
Processing Systems, pages 2069–2079, 2017.
O. Bastani, Y. Ioannou, L. Lampropoulos, D. Vytin-
iotis, A. Nori, and A. Criminisi. Measuring neu-
ral net robustness with constraints. In Advances in
neural information processing systems, pages 2613–
2621, 2016.
V. Behzadan and A. Munir. Vulnerability of deep re-
inforcement learning to policy induction attacks. In
International Conference on Machine Learning and
Data Mining in Pattern Recognition, pages 262–275.
Springer, 2017.
B. Biggio and F. Roli. Wild patterns: Ten years af-
ter the rise of adversarial machine learning. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1712.03141, 2017.
B. Biggio, B. Nelson, and P. Laskov. Poisoning attacks
against support vector machines. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1206.6389, 2012.
T. B. Brown, N. Carlini, C. Zhang, C. Olsson, P. Chris-
tiano, and I. Goodfellow. Unrestricted adversarial
examples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1809.08352, 2018.
N. Carlini and D. Wagner. Adversarial examples are
not easily detected: Bypassing ten detection meth-
ods. In Proceedings of the 10th ACM Workshop
on Artificial Intelligence and Security, pages 3–14.
ACM, 2017a.
N. Carlini and D. Wagner. Towards evaluating the
robustness of neural networks. In Security and Pri-
vacy (SP), 2017 IEEE Symposium on, pages 39–57.
IEEE, 2017b.
N. Carlini and D. Wagner. Audio adversarial exam-
ples: Targeted attacks on speech-to-text. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1801.01944, 2018.
N. Carlini, G. Katz, C. Barrett, and D. L. Dill.
Provably minimally-distorted adversarial examples.
arxiv preprint. arXiv, 1709, 2017.
F. Chollet et al. Keras. https://keras.io, 2015.
C. Chu, A. Zhmoginov, and M. Sandler. Cycle-
gan: a master of steganography. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1712.02950, 2017.
N. Dalvi, P. Domingos, S. Sanghai, D. Verma, et al.
Adversarial classification. In Proceedings of the
tenth ACM SIGKDD international conference on
Knowledge discovery and data mining, pages 99–
108. ACM, 2004.
G. F. Elsayed, D. Krishnan, H. Mobahi, K. Regan, and
S. Bengio. Large margin deep networks for classifi-
cation. arXiv preprint arXiv:1803.05598, 2018.
A. Fawzi, S.-M. Moosavi-Dezfooli, and P. Frossard.
Robustness of classifiers: from adversarial to ran-
dom noise. In Advances in Neural Information Pro-
cessing Systems, pages 1632–1640, 2016.
R. Feinman, R. R. Curtin, S. Shintre, and A. B. Gard-
ner. Detecting adversarial samples from artifacts.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1703.00410, 2017.
V. Fischer, M. C. Kumar, J. H. Metzen, and T. Brox.
Adversarial examples for semantic image segmenta-
tion. arXiv preprint arXiv:1703.01101, 2017.
A. Galloway, T. Tanay, and G. W. Taylor. Adver-
sarial training versus weight decay. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1804.03308, 2018.
J. Gilmer, L. Metz, F. Faghri, S. S. Schoenholz,
M. Raghu, M. Wattenberg, and I. Goodfellow. Ad-
versarial spheres. arXiv preprint arXiv:1801.02774,
2018.
I. Goodfellow, N. Papernot, S. Huang, Y. Duan,
P. Abbeel, and J. Clark. Attacking machine learning
with adversarial examples. OpenAI. https://blog.
openai. com/adversarial-example-research, 2017.
I. J. Goodfellow, J. Shlens, and C. Szegedy. Explaining
and harnessing adversarial examples. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1412.6572, 2014.
K. Grosse, P. Manoharan, N. Papernot, M. Backes,
and P. McDaniel. On the (statistical) detec-
tion of adversarial examples. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1702.06280, 2017a.
K. Grosse, N. Papernot, P. Manoharan, M. Backes,
and P. McDaniel. Adversarial examples for malware
detection. In European Symposium on Research in
Computer Security, pages 62–79. Springer, 2017b.
S. Gu and L. Rigazio. Towards deep neural network
architectures robust to adversarial examples. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1412.5068, 2014.
T. Gu, B. Dolan-Gavitt, and S. Garg. Badnets: Iden-
tifying vulnerabilities in the machine learning model
supply chain. arXiv preprint arXiv:1708.06733,
2017.
C. Guo, G. Pleiss, Y. Sun, and K. Q. Weinberger.
On calibration of modern neural networks. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1706.04599, 2017.
J. Hayes and G. Danezis. Generating steganographic
images via adversarial training. In Advances in Neu-
ral Information Processing Systems, pages 1954–
1963, 2017.
S. Huang, N. Papernot, I. Goodfellow, Y. Duan, and
P. Abbeel. Adversarial attacks on neural network
policies. arXiv preprint arXiv:1702.02284, 2017.
A. Ilyas, L. Engstrom, A. Athalye, and J. Lin. Query-
efficient black-box adversarial examples. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1712.07113, 2017.
R. Jia and P. Liang. Adversarial examples for evaluat-
ing reading comprehension systems. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1707.07328, 2017.
J. Jo and Y. Bengio. Measuring the tendency of cnns to
learn surface statistical regularities. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1711.11561, 2017.
G. Katz, C. Barrett, D. L. Dill, K. Julian, and M. J.
Kochenderfer. Reluplex: An efficient smt solver for
verifying deep neural networks. In International
Conference on Computer Aided Verification, pages
97–117. Springer, 2017.
C. Kereliuk, B. L. Sturm, and J. Larsen. Deep learn-
ing and music adversaries. IEEE Transactions on
Multimedia, 17(11):2059–2071, 2015.
P. W. Koh and P. Liang. Understanding black-box
predictions via influence functions. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1703.04730, 2017.
J. Kos, I. Fischer, and D. Song. Adversarial ex-
amples for generative models. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1702.06832, 2017.
A. Kurakin, I. Goodfellow, and S. Bengio. Adversar-
ial examples in the physical world. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1607.02533, 2016a.
A. Kurakin, I. Goodfellow, and S. Bengio. Adver-
sarial machine learning at scale. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1611.01236, 2016b.
M. Lin, Q. Chen, and S. Yan. Network in network.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.4400, 2013.
Y. Liu, X. Chen, C. Liu, and D. Song. Delving into
transferable adversarial examples and black-box at-
tacks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1611.02770, 2016.
D. Lowd and C. Meek. Adversarial learning. In
Proceedings of the eleventh ACM SIGKDD interna-
tional conference on Knowledge discovery in data
mining, pages 641–647. ACM, 2005.
J. Lu, H. Sibai, E. Fabry, and D. Forsyth. No need
to worry about adversarial examples in object de-
tection in autonomous vehicles. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1707.03501, 2017.
Y. Luo, X. Boix, G. Roig, T. Poggio, and Q. Zhao.
Foveation-based mechanisms alleviate adversarial
examples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1511.06292, 2015.
A. Madry, A. Makelov, L. Schmidt, D. Tsipras,
and A. Vladu. Towards deep learning models
resistant to adversarial attacks. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1706.06083, 2017.
S. Mei and X. Zhu. Using machine teaching to identify
optimal training-set attacks on machine learners. In
AAAI, pages 2871–2877, 2015.
J. H. Metzen, T. Genewein, V. Fischer, and
B. Bischoff. On detecting adversarial perturbations.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1702.04267, 2017.
S. M. Moosavi Dezfooli, A. Fawzi, and P. Frossard.
Deepfool: a simple and accurate method to fool deep
neural networks. In Proceedings of 2016 IEEE Con-
ference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recogni-
tion (CVPR), number EPFL-CONF-218057, 2016.
S.-M. Moosavi-Dezfooli, A. Fawzi, O. Fawzi, and
P. Frossard. Universal adversarial perturbations.
arXiv preprint, 2017a.
S.-M. Moosavi-Dezfooli, A. Fawzi, O. Fawzi,
P. Frossard, and S. Soatto. Analysis of uni-
versal adversarial perturbations. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1705.09554, 2017b.
L. Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez, B. Biggio, A. Demontis, A. Pau-
dice, V. Wongrassamee, E. C. Lupu, and F. Roli.
Towards poisoning of deep learning algorithms with
back-gradient optimization. In Proceedings of the
10th ACM Workshop on Artificial Intelligence and
Security, pages 27–38. ACM, 2017.
B. Nelson, M. Barreno, F. J. Chi, A. D. Joseph, B. I.
Rubinstein, U. Saini, C. A. Sutton, J. D. Tygar, and
K. Xia. Exploiting machine learning to subvert your
spam filter. LEET, 8:1–9, 2008.
B. Neyshabur, S. Bhojanapalli, D. McAllester, and
N. Srebro. Exploring generalization in deep learn-
ing. In Advances in Neural Information Processing
Systems, pages 5949–5958, 2017.
N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, A. Sinha, and M. Well-
man. Towards the science of security and privacy in
machine learning. arXiv preprint arXiv:1611.03814,
2016a.
N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, X. Wu, S. Jha, and
A. Swami. Distillation as a defense to adversarial
perturbations against deep neural networks. In Se-
curity and Privacy (SP), 2016 IEEE Symposium on,
pages 582–597. IEEE, 2016b.
N. Papernot, P. McDaniel, I. Goodfellow, S. Jha, Z. B.
Celik, and A. Swami. Practical black-box attacks
against machine learning. In Proceedings of the 2017
ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Com-
munications Security, pages 506–519. ACM, 2017.
A. Rozsa, M. Gunther, and T. E. Boult. Towards ro-
bust deep neural networks with bang. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1612.00138, 2016.
S. Sabour, Y. Cao, F. Faghri, and D. J. Fleet. Adver-
sarial manipulation of deep representations. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1511.05122, 2015.
L. Schmidt, S. Santurkar, D. Tsipras, K. Talwar, and
A. Madry. Adversarially robust generalization re-
quires more data. arXiv preprint arXiv:1804.11285,
2018.
C. Szegedy, W. Zaremba, I. Sutskever, J. Bruna,
D. Erhan, I. Goodfellow, and R. Fergus. Intrigu-
ing properties of neural networks. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1312.6199, 2013.
T. Tanay and L. D. Griffin. A boundary tilting
persepective on the phenomenon of adversarial ex-
amples. arXiv preprint arXiv:1608.07690, 2016.
F. Trame`r, A. Kurakin, N. Papernot, D. Boneh,
and P. McDaniel. Ensemble adversarial train-
ing: Attacks and defenses. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1705.07204, 2017.
D. Tsipras, S. Santurkar, L. Engstrom, A. Turner, and
A. Madry. There is no free lunch in adversarial ro-
bustness (but there are unexpected benefits). arXiv
preprint arXiv:1805.12152, 2018.
S. Zagoruyko and N. Komodakis. Wide residual net-
works. arXiv preprint arXiv:1605.07146, 2016.
